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FOREIGN CORPORATIONS-STATE BOUNDARIES FOR
NATIONAL BUSINESS
THE United States combines economic unity with political federalism. As
a result, corporations chartered in one state ' carry on an enormous volume
of trading in other states, to which they are "foreign." Nor is the chartering
state necessarily the locus of a corporation's principal contacts.- Promoters
tend to seek a charter in a state whose laws entail a minimum of expense
and the least restriction of corporate and managerial powers. This trend
has been intensified by a "race of laxity," 3 in which state legislatures com-
pete in their efforts to attract revenue from out-of-state enterprises. 4 Thus
the "tramp" corporation, chartered in one state for the evident purpose of
1. The granting of ordinary charters is theoretically a function of the state legis-
latures. 1 FLErcHER, CYcrorEnL& OF THE LAW OF PRivATE CoaRommo:zs § 114 (1931).
Under modem general incorporation acts, incorporators of course write their own char-
ters, in conformity with broad statutory restrictions. BRT & WAnmn, CASES AND
MATERIALS ON THE LAW OF Busmxss ORGANIZATION (Co-Rn0oATxs) 1-2 (1948).
While a state's power to create corporations is part of its sovereign prerogative, Con-
gress' constitutional authority to grant corporate charters is found in the commerce clause,
the "necessary and proper" clause, and the power to legislate for the territories and the
District of Columbia. 1 Fi.rcHEm, op. cit. stipra, §§ 121-2. Exercise of the power of
Congress to grant charters to privately owned corporations formed to carry on inter-
state and foreign commerce seems to have been confined to communication and transpor-
tation enterprises. See Berlack, Federal Incorporation and Securities Regulation, 49
HAv. L. Rnv. 396, 397 (1936).
2. Many states extend the privilege of securing a charter to nonresident incorpora-
tors. E.g., ARiz. CoDE ANN. § 53-203 (1939) ("Any number of persons"); DEL. R-v.
CODE c. 65, § 1 (1935) ("Any number of persons, not less than three"). Furthermore,
the inconveniences of distance are minimized by the mail-order service offered by in-
corporating companies. See CoRoRATioN TRUST Co., DELAwArn CoRPonATIONS 9 (1949).
3. The widely quoted phrase comes from Mr. Justice Brandeis' excursion, in dissent,
into the history of corporate regulation, in Louis K. Liggett Co. v. Lee, 283 U.S. 517,
541, 559 (1933). He felt that the impact of the foreign corporation had resulted in a
general deterioration of state regulatory laws, in that the removal of old-fashioned limits
on corporate size and powers often came not from a conviction that the restrictions were
undesirable but rather from the fear that they would be circumvented by foreign incor-
poration. Id. at 557.
4. Competition between states for charters is a well recognized legislative motive.
See, e.g., Professor Beard's JEFrmsoN, Coano.xRAos A;D THE CozsrrrurTon 17, 31
(1936); Dimocx & HYDE, BUREAUCRALC AND TRUSTEESHip iN LARGE CORPORATIONS 130
(TNEC Monograph 11, 1940) ; LAncozl, THE Dm.Aw~m ConpoRAn o: 10 ct scq. (1937).
Delaware approved 7,537 charters in 1929, id. at 155, and in 1932 it was the charter state
of 34% of 606 industrial companies listed on the New York Stock Exchange. Id. at 175.
A study of 162 foreign corporations registered in Wisconsin disclosed that 120 of
them were Wisconsin concerns to the extent of having 40% or more of their capital
represented in Wisconsin, and that 84 of these were incorporated in Delaware. Their
charters indicated that many of them were attracted by features of the Delaware law
not available in Wisconsin. Shiels, Wihy Do Wisconsin Concerns Incorporate in Other
States?, 11 Wis. L. REv. 457 (1936).
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doing business in others, has become an accepted instrument of American
corporate enterprise.
The "tramp" has evoked special legislative recognition from the state
unable to exert control through the corporate charter. While every state
has detailed laws delineating corporate privileges, duties and liabilities, the
statutory words "every corporation" have often been construed as embrac-
ing only domestic corporations.' The extension of local rules to foreign
corporations often requires express statutory reference.7 Here at least the
legislatures have not been lax for long. All states have special laws pro-
viding for service of process; 8 most states require filing of information for
public record I and assess a variety of taxes.
However, the need for legitimate "equalizing" legislation 10 presents an
5. But legislation for foreign corporations does not in general attempt to distinguish
between the enterprise incorporated in its principal place of business and the enterprise
chartered in a state where it has no business contacts.
6. Armstrong v. Dyer, 268 N.Y. 671, 198 N.E. 551 (1935) (statutory liability of
stockholders for debts to employees); Vanderpoel v. Gorman, 140 N.Y. 563, 35 N.E.
932 (1894) (statute forbidding assignments in contemplation of corporation's insolvency).
But cf. State ex. rel. Spillman v. Brictson Mfg. Co., 114 Neb. 341, 207 N.W. 664 (1926)
(statute providing for appointment of trustees for creditors of ousted or dissolved cor-
poration); Miller v. Quincy, 179 N.Y. 294, 72 N.E. 116 (1904) (statute authorizing
action against directors for waste of corporate property). See 17 FLETaCHER, Op, Cit.
supra note 1, § 8301; Note, 40 CoL. L. Rnv. 1210, 1224 (1940). It would seem that the
purpose of a statute forbidding preferential assignments might well be the protection of
local creditors without regard to place of incorporation. That this was thp view of the
New York legislators is indicated by the fact that the holding in the Vanderpocl case,
supra, provoked amendment to include foreign corporations. See Irving Trust Co. v.
Maryland Casualty Co., 83 F.2d 168, 170 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 299 U.S. 571 (1936).
7. Some common-law duties, for example that of permitting stockholders to inspect
books and records within the forum, are extended to foreign corporations despite the
absence of statutory command. Wise v. H. M. Byllesby & Co., 285 111. App. 40, 47-8,
1 N.E.2d 536, 539-40 (1936) (alternative holding) ; Rogers v. American Tobacco Co.,
143 Misc. 306, 257 N.Y. Supp. 321 (Sup. Ct.), aff'd, 233 App. Div. 708, 249 N.Y. Supp.
993 (1st Dep't 1931).
8. See note 37 infra.
On the necessity of jurisdictional statutes, see St. Clair v. Cox, 106 U.S. 350, 354-5
(1882) : "Formerly it was held that a foreign corporation could not be sued in an action
for recovery of a personal demand outside of the State by which it was chartered.
"... To meet and obviate this inconvenience and injustice, the legislatures of sev-
eral States interposed, and provided for service of process on officers and agents of
foreign corporations doing business therein."
And see Dodgem Corp. v. D. D. Murphy Shows, Inc., 96 Ind. App. 325, 333-4, 183
N.E. 699, 702 (1932).
9. See note 30 infra.
10. See Pembina Consolidated Silver Mining & Milling Co. v. Pennsylvania, 125
U.S. 181, 189 (1888) : "It is not every corporation, lawful in the State of its creation, that
other States may be willing to admit within their jurisdiction or consent that it have
offices in them; such, for example, as a corporation for lotteries. And even where the
business of a' foreign corporation is not unlawful in other States the latter may wish to
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opportunity for the raising of interstate barriers, with the aim of conferring
a competitive advantage upon locally incorporated businesses. Regulation
designed to force conformity to local policy can be expanded to "protec-
tionism." 1" This issue first arose in an era of economic provincialism and
hostility toward "outsiders." 12 Checker-board thinking dominated legisla-
tive and judicial minds. Local "protectionism" received doctrinal justifica-
tion in terms of state constitutional power. Since a corporate charter was
considered to confer no legal existence outside the state which granted it,"
recognition of that existence elsewhere was merely a matter of comity. 14
It was said that a state might exclude a foreign corporation entirely if it saw
fit."5 Furthermore, the power to exclude carried with it as a corollary the
right to admit the corporation subject to conditions. G
limit the number of such corporations, or to subject their business to such control as
would be in accordance with the policy governing domestic corporations of a similar
character."
11. For example, statutes requiring foreign insurance companies to insure persons
or property within a state only through resident agents, e.g., IDAHO CODE Az,' ; § 41-901
(Supp. 1949), serve to keep business in the hands of local residents. Similarly, taxation
so graduated as to discourage chain store merchandising serves to protect local store-
keepers from "outside" competition. See note 66 infra.
12. See Isaacs, An Analysis of Doing Business, 25 CoL L. Rnv. 1018 (1925).
13. See Bank of Augusta v. Earle, 13 Pet. 519, 588 (U.S. 1839); 17 Fxnrcmm, op.
cit. supra note 1, § 8314.
14. In order to uphold the validity of a contract entered into by a foreign corpora-
tion outside the state of its creation, and yet adhere to its geographically restrictive theory
of corporate existence, the Supreme Court invoked the idea that comity was to be ex-
tended to foreign laws provided they were not repugnant to the state's policy or pre-
judicial to its interests. Bank of Augusta v. Earle, supra note 13, at 589. Repug-
nancy may be indicated by legislation, but in the absence of statute or other affirma-
tive evidence of the state's policy, the courts will not overthrow the presumption in favor
of comity, and will recognize the powers of a foreign corporation. Id. at 591-7; Thomp-
son v. Waters, 25 Mlich. 214 (1872) (foreign railroad could hold title to local land);
17 Fxnrcnm, op. cit. supra note 1, § 8332. But cf. American Telephone & Telegraph
Co. v. Secretary of State, 159 Mich. 195, 123 N.W. 563 (1909) (under statute subjecting
foreign corporations to same restrictions as domestic, a statutory policy of limiting powers
of telephone and telegraph companies was held applicable to foreign concern).
15. See Paul v. Virginia, 8 Wall. 168, 181 (U.S. 1869) (foreign insurance companies
could be obliged to post a bond, though none required of domestic companies). Reason-
ing from the opinion in Bank of Augusta v. Earle, 13 Pet. 519 (U.S. 1839), the Court
pointed out that corporations are not entitled to the privileges and immunities of citizens.
Paul v. Virginia, supra, at 178--82. In finding a power to "exclude entirely," the Court
was only making more explicit the dictum of the Augusta case to the effect that the
recognition prompted only by comity might be withheld.
16. Paul v. Virginia, supra note 15. Without state powers to exclude and impose
conditions, the Court feared, a "flood" of foreign corporations would soon control a
state's principal business. Id. at 182. The Virginia statute might conceivably have been
upheld without resort to the power to exclude. Even if foreign corporations were held
to be entitled to the privileges and immunities of citizens, a distinction between resident
and nonresident firms could be supported as a reasonable legislative classification if not
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But the power to exact conditions was subsequently circumscribed. Any
theoretical carte blanche has been delimited by decisions invoking the Fed-
eral Constitution. Due process 17 measured by "fair play and substantial
justice" '8 permits a corporation to be sued 19 or taxed,2" in a foreign state
only if its activities there are sufficient to constitute "doing business." 21
What activities are sufficient depends on the burden sought to be imposed.
22
The commerce clause 23 forbids a state to tax the business of a foreign cor-
poration whose activities are "wholly" in interstate commerce, 4 or to ex-
clude it from its courts.25 Once a foreign corporation has been admitted to a
substantially discriminatory. See HENDERSON, THE POSITION OF FORF.IGN CO nr0tATIONS
IN AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAw 105-6 (1918). But the exclusion doctrine became
useful. In 1870, in a case which arose before the Fourteenth Amendment was adopted,
it was invoked to sustain a discriminatory municipal tax on the receipts of local agents
of foreign insurance companies, where the statute was in force at the time the agent
took out a license. Ducat v. Chicago, 10 Wall. 410 (U.S. 1870).
17. The long-established doctrine that corporations are "persons" within the meaning
of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Federal Constitution, Santa Clara County v, South-
em Pacific R.R., 118 U.S. 394 (1886) (equal protection); Minneapolis & St. L. Ry, v.
Beckwith, 129 U.S. 26 (1889) (due process), does not enjoy unanimous judicial approval.
See Mr. Justice Douglas, dissenting in Wheeling Steel Corp. v. Glander, 337 U.S. 562,
576 et seq. (1949) ; Mr. Justice Black, dissenting in Connecticut General Life Ins. Co. v.
Johnson, 303 U.S. 77, 83, 85 et seq. (1938).
18. International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316, 320 (1945).
19. See note 32 infra.
20. See note 76 infra.
21. The question of what amounts to "doing business" is one of difficulty both for
courts and for corporate managers. Although the meaning of the term is crucial in
interpreting the statutes as well as in resolving constitutional claims, the legislatures
attempt no comprehensive definitions. The draftsmen of the Uniform Foreign Corpora-
tion Act contented themselves in Section 2 with specifying some illustrative transactions
which do not constitute doing business. HANDBOOK OF THE NATIONAL CONFEUaNUc OF
COmmISSIoNaRS ON UNIFORM STATE: LAWS 287-8, 307 (1934).22. Different degrees of activity may be discerned as the requisite "doing business"
for service of process, for taxation, and for registration. An attempt at generalization
is made in Isaacs, .pra note 12.
23. Federal supremacy over commerce among the states precludes a state from
forbidding the doing of either corporate or individual interstate business within its terri-
tory. Pensacola Telegraph Co. v. Western Union Telegraph Co., 96 U.S. 1 (1877) (state
could not, by granting exclusive privilege of maintaining a telegraph line, exclude other
companies which were permitted to maintain lines under federal law passed in the interest
of commerce).
24. Alpha Portland Cement Co. v. Massachusetts, 268 U.S. 203 (1925) (excise tax
measured by proportions of capital and of net income allocable to, the state). Only two
members of the present Court joined in the contrary reasoning of Justice Rutledge in
Interstate Oil Pipe Line Co. v. Stone, 337 U.S. 662 (1949), 48 MIcH. L. REv. 360 (1950).
Four, or perhaps five, of the Justices who participated in that decision adhered to the
view that a state may not tax the privilege of carrying on interstate commerce.
25. Dahnke-Walker Milling Co. v. Bondurant, 257 U.S. 282 (1921) (purchase of
goods for immediate interstate shipment). But the range of activities deemed wholly
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state the equal protection clause is said to prohibit its being subjected to
discrimination between corporations foreign and domestic. 8 And it has
often been held that a state may not require a foreign corporation to forego,
as a condition of admission, a constitutional protection which it would other-
wise enjoy.- In the light of these decisions it would seem that a state no
longer has the power to exclude altogether any corporation it wants to ex-
clude. In any case, their impact serves seriously to limit application of the
maxim "the power to exclude is the power to exact conditions."
Despite these developments, inequality persists. Many states by statute
assert that the privileges and restrictions of foreign and domestic firms are
the same, 2 but these statutes'are often reduced to pious legislative avowals
of a non-existent policy. Indeed, some commonly used statutory devices
openly favor domestic corporations. Others, though seemingly calculated
to produce equalitarian results, nevertheless permit inequalities in some of
the situations in which they are applied. "Protection" against foreign cor-
porations has not altogether given way to treatment more consistent with
an interdependent economy.
interstate or foreign commerce is narrow. Union Brokerage Co. v. Jensen, 3_" U.S. 202
(1944) (statute applicable to customhouse broker); Kansas City Structural Steel Co.
v. Arkansas, 269 U.S. 148 (1925) (local delivery to foreign subcontractor by foreign
contractor of imported materials under a construction contract).
26. Power Mfg. Co. v. Saunders, 274 U.S. 490 (1927) (venue); Hanover Fire Ins.
Co. v. Harding, 272 U.S. 494 (1926) (taxation); Southern Ry. v. Greene, 216 U.S.
400 (1910) (taxation) ; 17 Fwrcnmi, op. cit. supra note 1, § 8396. See pages 751-2 infra.
27. This is the doctrine of "unconstitutional conditions." It was crucial in cases
involving deprivation of the right of foreign corporate defendants to remove state cases
to the federal courts. Expulsion from the state for violation of a statute forbidding re-
moval was approved in Doyle v. Continental Ins. Co., 94 U.S. 535 (1877). This hold-
ing was overruled in Terral v. Burke Construction Co, 257 U.S. 529 (1922), where
the Court adopted the view of the doctrine taken by Mr. Justice Bradley, dissenting in
the Doyle case, supra, at 543, and by Mr. Justice Day, dissenting in Security Mutual
Life Ins. Co. v. Prewitt, 202 U.S. 246, 258, 267-9 (1906). It appeared in the tax field
in ir. Justice Harlan's dissenting opinion in Philadelphia Fire Ass'n v. New York; 119
U.S. 110, 120, 125-8 (1886), and was invoked to nullify tax statutes which discrimi-
nated against foreign corporations, in Western Union Telegraph Co. v. Kansas, 216
U.S. 1 (1910), and Hanover Fire Ins. Co. v. Harding, 272 U.S. 494 (1926). It
was relied on in finding invalid a statute establishing unequal venue provisions, in Power
Mfg. Co. v. Saunders, 274 U.S. 490 (1927).
The idea is difficult to reconcile logically with a total exclusion power. See Mr.
Justice Holmes, dissenting in Western Union Telegraph Co. v. Kansas, supro, at 52
et seq., and in Power Mfg. Co. v. Saunders, supra, at 497-S. As applied to equal pro-
tection in taxation, it has been virtually repudiated by the Court. See pages 751-2 infra.
On the doctrine generally see HNDERSON, op. cit. supra note 16, c. VIII and pp. 161-2;
Hale, Unconstifttiozal Conditions and Constitutional Rights, 35 Cot. L. Rnv. 321 (1935);
Merrill, Uzconstitutional Conditions, 77 U. oF PA. L. R-v. 879 (1929).
28. In the statutes or constitutions of a majority of the states there exist "equality"
provisions which define the overall rights and liabilities of foreign corporations or their
officers and stockholders, or their rights and liabilities in specified particulars, by stating
that they shall be equal to those of domestic corporations. See pages 752-7 infra.
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REGISTRATION AND JURISDICTION
Insofar as a state is not obliged to recognize the legal existence of foreign
corporations, it is free to require local incorporation as a condition of doing
local business. But reincorporation is demanded today only in the case of a
few special types of enterprises.29 Instead, states merely require foreign
firms to register. Registration consists essentially of filing the corporate
charter, together with such information as the location of the principal local
office," and appointment of an agent for service of process.31
Registration is not a prerequisite of jurisdiction.3 2 Service on the ordinary
agents of a corporation who are present for business purposes may subject
it to suit even though its business activities in a state are not such as to
justify requiring it to appoint a process agent.33 The Supreme Court's test
29. In theory, the result of incorporation in a second state is two separate legal en-
tities rather than one. 1 FLETCnER, op. cit. msipra note 1, § 120; Beale, Corporationls of
Two States, 4 CoL. L. REv. 391, 393 (1904). Multiple incorporation is rare outside of
the railroad field, where it is a result of consolidations. See Steckler v. Pennroad Corp.,
136 F.2d 197, 199-200 n.4 (3d Cir. 1943), cert. denied, 320 U.S. 757 (1943). Thus,
South Carolina allows railroad lines within the state to be owned or operated only by
domestic corporations, but a foreign railroad may organize a South Carolina subsidiary,
with which it may be consolidated. S.C. CoNsT. Art. 9, § 8; S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 7777-9,
7785 (1942). Exclusion in this sense may give way to an overriding federal power:
the Interstate Commerce Commission, acting in a consolidation proceeding, is not bound
by these laws. Seaboard Airline R.R. v. Daniel, 333 U.S. 118 (1948). States require
local charters for certain other types of activity. Some do not admit foreign corpora-
tions doing a general banking business. MiNx. STAT. ANN. § 303.04 (West, Supp. 1949).
Georgia requires any corporation owning 5000 acres or more of Georgia land (mineral
rights excepted) to be locally incorporated. GA. CODE ANN. §22-1504 (Supp. 1947).
Virginia denies to foreign public utility corporations the privilege of doing an intra-
state business, VA. CoNsT. § 163, but a foreign firm may form a local subsidiary and
merge with it. See Railway Express Agency, Inc. v. Commonwealth, 153 Va. 498, 513,
150 S.E. 419, 423 (1929), aff'd, 282 U.S. 440 (1931).
30. The statutes typically require submission of a statement giving the corporation's
name, purposes, principal place of business, principal office within the qualifying state,
stated capital, and sometimes the names and addresses of its directors. E.g., ILL. ANN.
STAT. c. 32, § 157.106 (1934); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 14:15-3 (1937); N.Y. GEN. CoRP.
LAw § 210.
31. See note 37 infra.
32. Where a state provided by statute for service of process on the agents of foreign
corporations, a company which maintained an agent in the state was deemed to have
assented to service though it had given no express consent. Lafayette Ins. Co. v.
French, 18 How. 404 (U.S. 1856). But cf. St. Clair v. Cox, 106 U.S. 350 (1882)
(service on agent invalid unless corporation doing business in forum).
33. The fact that a corporation which fails to appoint a process agent is engaged
entirely in interstate commerce does not by itself confer immunity from process, if an
agent carrying on its business in a state can be found and served there. International
Harvester Co. of America v. Kentucky, 234 U.S. 579 (1914) (continuous solicitation
by traveling agents having authority only to take orders and receive payment) ; Tauza
v. Susquehanna Coal Co., 220 N.Y. 259, 115 N.E. 915 (1917). But cf. Davis v. Farmers
Co-operative Equity Co., 262 U.S. 312 (1923) (nonresident plaintiff, cause of action
arising in another state).
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of "fair play and substantial justice" 3 for such cases has made it more
difficult for the foreign corporation to escape local jurisdiction. 31
But since finding a corporate agent may be difficult, the primary function
of a registration law is to make the foreign corporation readily suable in the
local courts.3" The statutes attempt to insure availability of a person on
whom valid process may be served, by requiring the designation of an agent
expressly authorized to receive it. 7 These statutes, when complied with,
make it no more inconvenient or expensive to sue a foreign than a domestic
corporation.38 And the foreign corporation's burden of defending is not
34. Abandoning the "implied consent" and the "presence" pluaseology, the Supreme
Court set up a new test of due process. International Shoe Co. v. Vashington, 326
U.S. 310, 316, 320 (1945). A systematic and continuous course of solicitation by agents
who rented, sample rooms was held to support jurisdiction for the purpose of collecting
a contribution to the state unemployment fund. See Note, The Growth of the Interna-
tional Shoe Doctrine, 16 U. oF CHL L. Ray. 523 (1949).
35. It appears to have reduced the quantum of corporate activity required to sup-
port jurisdiction, by doing away with the rule that "mere solicitation" is not "doing
business." See id. at 525-30.
36. Compliance with a registration statute constitutes consent on the part of a non-
resident corporation to suit begun against it by service on its designated agent not only
in the state courts, Bagdon v. Philadelphia & Reading Coal & Iron Co, 217 N.Y. 432,
111 N.E. 1075 (1916), but also in the federal courts of that state, Neirbo Co. v. Beth-
lehem Shipbuilding Corp., 308 U.S. 165 (1939) (venue).
37. Every state requires either that a foreign corporation name a resident process
agent of its own choice, e.g., Amiz. CODE ANN. § 53-301 (Supp. 1949) ; or requires that it
appoint, or be deemed to have appointed a state official its agent for the same purpose, e.g.,
N.Y. GEN. CoRP. Law § 210. Some add a provision that service on the official vill be
valid if the agent is not maintained or cannot be found, e.g., ILL. Az.N. STAT. C. 3V,
§ 157.111 (1934).
38. Federal as well as state courts are an available forum. A corporation is a citi-
zen of the chartering state for federal jurisdictional purposes. Louisville, C. & C. ILR.
v. Letson, 2 How. 497, 557 (U.S. 1844); see Neirbo Co. v. Bethlehem Shipbuilding
Corp., 308 U.S. 165, 169 (1939). For local plaintiffs, therefore, diversity of citizenship
always exists in an action against a foreign corporation. The Judicial Code makes a
corporation suable in any judicial district in which it is incorporated or licensed to do
business or is doing business, and such district is regarded as its residence for venue
purposes. 28 U.S.C. § 1391 (Supp. 1949). But diversity gives the foreign corporation
the advantage, not enjoyed by domestic litigants, of being able to invoke federal juris-
diction against local individuals or firms, both in choosing its forum, under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1332 (Supp. 1949), when it is a plaintiff, and in removing to federal court, under 28
U.S.C. § 1441 (Supp. 1949), when it is sued in a state court. But removal is not likely
to prejudice seriously a plaintiff's convenience, for trial then takes place in the federal
district court for the district and division embracing the place where the state action
was pending. Ibid. And removal will of course leave unaffected the substantive law
applicable to the case. Erie R.R. v. Tompldns, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
Proposals were once made in Congress for legislation requiring a corporation to
be treated for jurisdictional purposes as a citizen of the state where it chiefly does
business, or of each state where it does business. See AxmucAx BAn AssocAyxoN,
REPORT Or TH= F-rr-F=n ANNuAL MEE-NCG 100 et seq. (1932).
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necessarily greater, since it is no longer realistic to assume that a corpora-
tion's principal contacts are in the state of its charter.
Often, neither foreign nor domestic corporations can avoid suit by failing
to register or failing to maintain an agent. Many legislatures have required
foreign, like domestic,39 corporations to submit to "substituted" service of
process on a state official if no corporate agent has been maintained." Pro-
vision is usually made for notifying the defendant by registered mail.41 But
in one state a registered foreign corporation must submit to jurisdiction in
these circumstances without notice, even though notice is required for do-
mestic corporations,4 2 and is thus subjected to a greater hazard of default
judgments.
The device of substituted service may be extended to corporations which'
fail to register. 43 This prevents the foreign firm from being able to hit and
run, to do business in a state and then withdraw." The test of "fair play
and substantial justice" is as appropriate for cases of substituted service
as for the case of service on an actual agent. Perhaps the new, more elastic
approach to the jurisdictional problem indicates that the Court would be
willing finally to do away with the result, reached via the older "implied
39. E.g., ARx. STAT. ANN. § 64-504 (1947).
40. E.g., Oms. ComP. LAWS ANN. § 77-301 (1940).
41. Most states provide equal treatment in this regard for foreign and domestic
corporations. E.g., ILL. ANN. STAT. c. 32, § 157.13 (Supp. 1949) and § 157.111 (1935);
N.Y. STocK CORp. LAW § 25 and N.Y. GEN. Coai. LAW § 217.
42. Compare WASH. Rsv. STAT. ANN. § 3836-18 (Supp. 1940) with id. § 227 (1932).
This difference in treatment was upheld as not violating due process or equal protec-
tion in Washington ex rel. Bond & Goodwin & Tucker, Inc. v. Superior Court, 289 U.S.
361 (1933) (foreign corporation, having complied and withdrawn, had burden of ar-
ranging to have notice if it wanted it; difference between treatment of foreign and do-
mestic corporations a permissible legislative classification). The Court strongly relied
on the exclusion power. Id. at 364, 365. Lack of notice would seem to make the deci-
sion questionable on due process grounds.
43. E.g., MAss. GEN. LAWs c. 181, § 3A (1932) ; S.C. CODs ANN. § 7765 (1942).
44. The hit-and-run problem is more likely to arise in the case of foreign than do-
mestic corporations. The Supreme Court early recognized this difference as support-
ing the application of special regulations to foreign corporations: "In the state where
a corporation is formed ... [d]irectors are readily found, as also the officers appointed
by them to manage its business. But the moment the boundary of the State is passed
difficulties arise; it is not so easy to determine who represent the corporation there ......
St. Clair v. Cox, 106 U.S. 350, 353-4 (1882). Today the place of business in the char-
tering state may be a mere formality, but a corporation which remains in business at
all will be deterred from disappearing from the one jurisdiction which can revoke its
charter or impose lesser sanctions which would cripple the corporate management. Del-
aware, for example, requires of domestic corporations an annual report stating the loca-
tion of the principal office in the state and the name of the agent upon whom process
may be* served. Wilful failure to file such report may disqualify all the directors from
election or re-election to any office in the corporation. DEm. REv. CODE c. 6, § 63 (1935).
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consent" doctrine, that an unregistered foreign corporation was not amena-
ble to substituted service on a cause of action arising in another state.45
PENALTIES FOR NON-REGISTRATION
A foreign corporation which fails to register before doing business " may
be denied the use of local courts to enforce local obligations. Statutes com-
monly declare that the noncomplying corporation's contracts are void on
its behalf but enforceable against it,17 or that no corporation which does
business without registering may bring or maintain any action in the courts
of the state,43 or both.49 Under either type of statute, a noncomplying cor-
poration may be barred from enforcing an otherwise valid agreement, 3
though it register before bringing suit 51 or while the litigation is pending.5 2
45. The Supreme Court held that, under a statute providing for service on an official
in the case of corporations failing to comply with the appointment requirement, such
service is not effective against such a corporation in a suit arising out of business done
outside the jurisdiction, Simon v. Southern Ry., 236 U.S. 115 (1915); Old Wayne
Mutual Life Ass'n of Indianapolis v. McDonough, 204 U.S. 8 (1907), whereas "express
assent" to such service will render it valid even though the cause of action be foreign,
Pennsylvania Fire Ins. Co. v. Gold Issue Mining & Milling Co., 243 U.S. 93 (1917).
The Court sought support for this result in the inconvenience and hardship in defend-
ing suits wherever business is done. See Simon v. Southern Ry., spra, at 130. De-
fense is likely to be more convenient in a state where sufficient business is done to have
impelled the corporation to register. But an e.mination of actual inconvenience would
seem a more realistic test than an inquiry whether the formality of local registration
has been observed. The "fair play and substantial justice!' test sanctions such an ex-
amination. The reasoning of the opinion, International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326
U.S. 310 (1945), seems broad enough to permit extension to the substituted service
situation. This is especially so in view of the judicial attrition of the doctrine of the
Simon and Old Wayne cases. See Cohen v. American Window Glass Co., 126 F.2d 111,
113 (2d Cir. 1942). And see Note, 16 U. OF Cr. L. REv. 523, 530-1 (1949).
46. The definition of "doing business" is attended by the usual uncertainty. But
some statutes specify activities which shall not of themselves bring foreign corporations
within the registration requirements. E.g., D. R'v. CODE c. 65, § 215 (1935) (solici-
tation by catalogs or by resident or traveling salesmen).
47. E.g., Wis. STAT. t 226.02(9) (1947) ("void on its behalf and on behalf of its
assigns, but shall be enforceable against it or them").
48. E.g., VT. STAT. § 5996 (1947) (no action on a contract made in the state if at
the time of making the contract the corporation was doing business without authority).
49. E.g., UTAH CODE Axrx., § 18-8-5 (1943).
50. E.g., Delaware River Quarry & Construction Co. v. Bethlehem & Nazareth
Passenger Ry., 204 Pa. 22, 53 Ad. 533 (1902) (statute providing no foreign corpora-
tion may do business until it has registered; claim on quantum meruit for labor and
materials denied).
Such a penalty, as applied to contracts made after passage of the statute, was held
not to violate either the contract clause or the due process clause of the Federal Con-
stitution, in view of the state's power to exclude a corporation or condition its en-
trance. Mlunday v. Wisconsin Trust Co., 252 U.S. 499 (1920).
51. Perkins Mfg. Co. v. Clinton Construction Co. of California, 211 Cal. 228, -195
Pac. 1 (1930) (statute prohibiting corporation from maintaining or defending any ac-
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Whatever its value as a punitive device, this penalty does not serve to
rectify the harm done by non-registration. The state's interest in registra-
tion lies in the receipt of taxes and the protection of its citizens against
irresponsible acts. To deny a noncomplying firm the right to enforce its
claims does not satisfy either of these interests,"3 but instead confers a wind-
fall on the person against whom the claim would be outstanding." 4 Even
considered as a deterrent rather than a remedial expedient, unenforceability
of contracts is a crude and erratic punishment. Many offenders may be
able to collect their claims without resort to legal action. Suit may be possi-
ble in another jurisdiction." And the firm which acts on a bona fide belief
that it is not transacting such business as to bring it within a registration
statute may be under the same disability as a wilful violator. If such provi-
sions are desirable at all, it seems clear that room should be left for the
courts to make exceptions.
State courts have, in fact, shown a tendency to give relief to a plaintiff
corporation if it later complies with the statute, albeit after the contract
was made. In the teeth of statutes making contracts unenforceable, they
have found it possible to allow an equitable action for the value of services
performed. 65 Or, if both parties adopt the terms of the invalid agreement by
tion and providing that contracts are void on behalf of corporation) ; Tri-State Amuse-
ment Co. v. Forest Park Highlands Amusement Co., 192 Mo. 404, 90 S.W. 1020 (1905)
(statute prohibiting corporation from maintaining any action). Compare Republic
Power & Service Co. v. Gus Blass Co., 165 Ark. 163, 263 S.W. 785 (1924) (statute pro-
viding that compliance after date of contract should not validate it), uith Waxahachie
Medicine Co. v. Daly, 122 Ark. 451, 183 S.W. 741 (1916) (statute providing that com-
pliance after institution of suit should not validate contract).
52. Midwest Sportswear Mfg. Co. v. Baraboo Chamber of Commerce, 161 F.2d 918
(7th Cir. 1947) (making of contract for acquisition of factory by plaintiff held to be
"doing business" under statute making contracts void).
53. See Mr. Justice Jackson, dissenting in Woods v. Interstate Realty Co., 337
U.S. 535, 538, 539-40 (1949), from a decision holding a contract unenforceable in fed-
eral as well as state courts: "The state statute as now interpreted by this Court is a
harsh, capricious and vindictive measure .... [T]he amount of this punishment bears
no relation to the amount of wrong done the State in failure to qualify and pay its
taxes. The penalty thus suffered does not go to the State, which sustained the injury,
but results in unjust enrichment of the debtor, who has suffered no injury from the
creditors' default in qualification."
54. The local defendant who is sued by a foreign corporation is of course not the
person whom the registration requirements of filing information and appointing a process
agent are designed to protect, for they are concerned with making the foreign corpora-
tion locally suable. See pages 742-5 supra. Reliance on a plaintiff's failure to regis-
ter has been termed a "rather immoral defense." Whyte, Business Associations, [1938]
Wis. L. REv. 52, 54.
55. Alleghany Co. v. Allen, 69 N.J.L. 270, 55 Atl. 724 (1903), writ of error dis-
missed, 196 U.S. 458 (1905) (note unenforceable but not "void" in state where made
may be enforced in another state).
56. See Pittsburgh Construction Co. v. West Side Belt R.R., 151 Fed. 125
(C.C.W.D. Pa.), aff'd, 154 Fed. 929 (3d Cir. 1907).
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acts done after the plaintiff's compliance with the registration requirement,
it may be enforced as a new obligation." Similarly, if the statute prohibits
"maintaining" rather than "commencing" a suit, a corporation can be held
competent to enforce its contracts if it complies either before or after bring-
ing its action. 5 Prior to Erie v. Tompkins it was possible to avoid many of
these statutes by utilizing a federal forum." But now in diversity suits the
federal court is bound by laws denying foreign corporations access to state
courts.60 Perhaps the new rule will amplify the impact of the statutes
sufficiently to stimulate their modification.6 '
Some legislatures as well as courts have tended to liberalize the non-
compliance provisions, and have made the penalty merely a disability to
sue before the requisite certificate is obtained.6 2 The weakness of such a
57. Montgomery Traction Co. v. Montgomery Light & Water Power Co., 229 Fed.
672 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 242 U.S. 628 (1916) (specific performance).
58. National Fertilizer Co. v. Fall River Five Cents Savings Bank, 196 Mfass. 458,
82 N.E. 671 (1907) (statute providing no action to be maintained so long as corpora-
tion fails to comply; corporation complied after bringing action but before hearing).
59. Where the effect of a noncompliance statute was only to prohibit maintenance
of actions in the state courts, the statute, being "procedural," did not bar action in a
federal court. David Lupton's Sons Co. v. Automobile Club of America, 225 U.S. 489
(1912); Republic Creosoting Co. v. Boldt Construction Co., 38 F2d 739 (6th Cir. 1930).
But where the statute made a contract void, either by its terms, Diamond Glue Co. v.
United States Glue Co., 103 Fed. 838 (C.C.E.D. Wis. 1900), aff'd, 187 U.S. 611 (1903),
or by state judicial construction, Cyclone Mining Co. v. Baker Light & Power Co., 165
Fed. 996 (C.C.D. Ore. 1908), enforcement was denied in the federal courts.
60. Woods v. Interstate Realty Co., 337 U.S. 535 (1949). The Supreme Court
had earlier held that Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938), required that a
federal court, when called upon to enforce state-created rights, was bound by a statute
closing state courts to proceedings on specified causes of action. Angel v. Bullington,
330 U.S. 183 (1947) (statute prohibiting suits for deficiency judgments under mort-
gages). In so holding, the Court had observed that the Lupto, decision, .rnpra note 59,
was obsolete insofar as it was based on a pre-Eric view of diversity jurisdiction. Id. at
192. See 49 CoL L. REv. 852 (1949) ; 44 Ir. L. RaV. 533 (1949).
61. The Woods decision, supra note 60, calls attention to the question whether state
legislators, in prohibiting suits by noncomplying foreign corporations, relied upon the
former availability of the federal forum. See Mr. Justice Jackson, dissenting in Woods
v. Interstate Realty Co., 337 U.S. 535, 538, 539 (1949). To the extent that they did,
statutory changes may be expected.
62. E.g., Ir.._ ANw. STAT. c. 32, § 157.125 (1934), enacted in 1933. The statute fur-
ther provides that failure to obtain a certificate shall not impair the validity of any con-
tract or act of the corporation and shall not disqualify the corporation from defend-
ing any action in the courts of the state. It also makes a corporation doing business
without authority liable to the state in the amount of all the fees and taxes which it
would have paid had it complied, plus ten per cent of that amount. Ibid.
That a corporation should thus be enabled to enforce contracts made before regis-
tration was the expressed intention of the draftsmen of the Illinois statute. See 1 Cur-
cAo BAR AssocrATiox, ILrxois BusrNEss ComoRATixo Acr AmnorA~mD 403-9
(2d ed. 1947). Even noncompliance continuing after suit is brought will not bar a
plaintiff from maintaining an action. Emcee Corp. v. George, 293 Ill. App. 240, 12
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statute is that it allows a corporation to pursue its activities with impunity
until it finds the use of the courts more profitable than further evasion of
the law.63 But the weakness can be, and often is, largely overcome by im-
posing a fine for noncompliance 64 and a requirement that past taxes and
fees be paid."5
TAXATION
Taxation is a means of directly and continuously influencing the economic
return from corporate business. A tax can be used as a means of making the
foreign corporation pay its fair share for the privilege of doing business in a
state. But it can also be used to eliminate legitimate competitive advan-
tage-as in the case of chain stores " 6-or simply as a method of "soaking
the foreigner" and "protecting" local enterprise.
N.E.2d 333 (1937) (doing business without certificate no ground for dismissal, because
if corporation should thereafter obtain certificate it could proceed with suit).
Pennsylvania has amended its statute to allow subsequent compliance and payment
of a fine to protect the corporation. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 3144 (1938). See Hoff-
man Construction Co. v. Erwin, 331 Pa. 384, 387, 200 Ati. 579, 580 (1938).
63. See MacDonald Bros., Inc. v. Quality Aluminum Casting Co., 251 Wis. 27, 32,
27 N.W.2d 769, 772 (1947) (if reinstatement restored right to sue on contract made
after forfeiture of license, expelled corporation could wait until it had a profitable con-
tract to enforce before requalifying).
64. Fines for doing business without registering are imposed by some states on
the corporation, e.g., MINN. STAT. ANN. § 303.20 (West, 1945) ; or on its officers and
agents, e.g., MAss. GEN. LAWS c. 181, § 5 (1932); or on both, e.g., CAL. CokV. CODE
ANN. §§ 6800, 6803 (1947). Use of a fine was the recommendation of the draftsmen of
the Uniform Foreign Corporation Act, who disapproved making contracts void on be-
half of the corporation. HANDBOOK OF THE NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF COUMxSSIONERS ON
UNIFOR1 STATE LAWs 329-30 (1934). Statutes in a few instances make officers, agents,
directors, and stockholders personally liable for the debts of a noncomplying foreign
corporation. E.g., VA. CODs ANN. § 13-218 (1950). In the absence of such a provision,
officers and agents are usually held not liable in jurisdictions where the statutes recog-
nize the validity of contracts made before compliance by permitting them to be en-
forced against the corporation and by permitting the corporation to bring an action on
them after complying. American Soap Co. v. Bogue, 114 Ohio St. 149, 150 N.E. 743
(1926). But cf. Joseph T. Ryerson & Son v. Shaw, 277 Ill. 524, 115 N.E. 650 (1917)
(officers liable in a jurisdiction where contracts were construed as void on behalf of
corporation but enforceable against it).
Officers of a foreign corporation may incur liability as partners for wrongs com-
mitted in carrying on an activity which is illegal for corporations in the jurisdiction.
Mandeville v. Courtright, 142 Fed. 97 (3rd Cir. 1905), cert. denied Sub norn. Mayer v.
Mandeville, 202 U.S. 615 (1906). See Note, 41 YALE L.J. 309 (1931).
65. E.g., ILL. ANN. STAT. c. 32, § 157.125 (1934) (past fees and taxes plus ten per
cent).
66. The desire to keep business in local hands by protecting it from the competi-
tion of multiple unit distribution is evident in the anti-chain store tax legislation which
became popular during the depression. E.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 204.01-204.16 (Supp.
1948); IND. STAT. ANN. §§ 42-301 to 42-313 (Bums, 1933). See Collins, Ati-Qihail
Store Legislation., 24 CoRNEr.L L.Q. 198 (1939). Although theses taxes are not directed
,against foreign corporations as such, many of the largest taxpayers are corporations ofIother states.
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The forms of state taxes on foreign corporations are as varied as their
purposes.67 Most states impose a flat entrance fee,s or one which varies
with the amount of the corporation's capital. A state may seek to keep
the combined cost of a foreign charter and local registration at least as high
as the cost of local incorporation." Some admission fees are made equal to
the fee a similar enterprise would pay upon local incorporation, if its total
stock were equal to that portion of the foreign corporation's stock allocable
to the state.71 Franchise and income taxes account for a predominant part
of state revenues from corporations. 72 They are often measured by cor-
porate business without regard for place of incorporation." These offer
no special economic barriers to foreign enterprise; they must be borne by all
competing corporations, foreign and domestic, doing a similar business
within the jurisdiction of the taxing state.
67. The variety of method and measure has long been troublesome to management.
See the report of a committee of the National Association of Manufacturers in 1903,
quoted in SEN. Doc. No. 92, Part 69-A, 70th Cong., 1st Sess. 56-7 (1934). Any ap-
proach to uniformity seems an unlikely prospect. When the Uniform Foreign Cor-
poration Act was drawn up, the Commissioners refrained from touching upon the sub-
ject of taxation because of the existing diversity of state laws. HANDOOK OF THE
NATIONAL Cox1mmI.NC OF Co issioNEas ON UN FoRm STATE LAws 305 (1934).
68. The largest amount among the states whose entrance fee consists only of a flat
tax is $300. TENN. CODE ANN. § 4120 (Villiams, 1934).
69. Such a tax may be based on all the corporation's authorized capital stock, e.g.,
N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 55-118 (1943); or on that portion of its authorized capital
stock which represents assets or business in the taxing state, e.g., ILL. Am;. STAT. c. 32,
§ 157.136 (Supp. 1949); or on the same portion of its issued stock, c.g., Omo GEN.
CoDE ANN. § 8625-9 (Supp. 1949).
70. See, e.g., the repeated actions of the New York legislature to make the initial
tax on foreign corporations as great as the organization tax imposed on domestic firms
in order to remove the inducement to incorporate elsewhere, recounted in People cx rel.
Elliott-Fisher Co. v. Sohmer, 148 App. Div. 514, 515-6, 132 N.Y. Supp. 789, 790-1 (3d
Dep't 1911), aff'd, 206 N.Y. 634, 99 N.E. 1115 (1912). Obviously, equal cost can be
attained only in a generalized way in view of the number of jurisdictions to which a
corporation might resort for a charter and the varied incidence of different tax laws
on corporations of different sizes, structures and earnings. It was found, for example,
that some firms having a substantial part of their capital in Wisconsin saved money
by incorporating in Delaware, while others found it slightly more expensive to do so.
Shiels, supra, note 4, at 463.
71. E.g., OHIo GEN. CODE ANN. § 8625-9 (Supp. 1949). The allocation basis is
property within the state and business done in the state as compared with total prop-
erty and business. Id. § 8625-8.
72. The Federal Treasury estimated that in 1938 the states collected -$313,000,000 in
the form of corporate privilege taxes. Of this, about 4200,000,000 was from corporate
income taxes and the greater part of the remainder was probably from annual franchise
taxes other than on income. HYNN G, TAXATiON OF CoRroRATE ETmrralsE 111
(TNEC Monograph 9, 1941).
73. Some states make a single scheme of annual franchise taxation expressly ap-
plicable to both foreign and domestic corporations. E.g., N.Y. TAx LAtw § 209. Many
subject foreign companies to the same apportioned income taxes as are imposed on do-
mestic corporations. E.g., PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 72, §3420b (1949).
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But some states have separate franchise taxes for corporations having
foreign charters, based on some form of allocation of capital or revenue.74
These may permit minor inequalities in the tax consequences of like business
activities depending on the methods of allocation.
7 5
Some constitutional protection from unequal taxation stems from the
equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 5 Southern Ry. I'.
Greene 7 held that the clause forbade discrimination, in the form of a fran-
chise tax not imposed on domestic corporations, against a previously ad-
mitted foreign corporation which had acquired property within the state.78
74. E.g., W. VA. CODE ANN. § 935 (1949).
75. The state seeks to tax the general privilege of doing business within the state.
See Ford Motor Co. v. Beauchamp, 308 U.S. 331, 334-5 (1939). Allocation fractions
for determining, on the basis of the corporation's local property, sales, payroll, or other
factors, what portion of its capital or income is to be attributed to the taxing state as
the measure of the tax are used to satisfy the due process prohibition, International Pa-
per Co. v. Massachusetts, 246 U.S. 135 (1918), of taxes on nonresidents based on prop-
erty or sources of income outside a state's jurisdiction. The results do not always re-
flect business done with any precision, but only in extreme cases will a corporation be
able to show that an allocation fraction produces a basis so out of proportion to the
amount of the business transacted as to violate due process. Compare Hans Rees' Sons,
Inc. v. North Carolina, 283 U.S. 123 (1931), with Butler Bros. v. McColgan, 315 U.S.
501 (1942). See International Harvester Co. v. Evatt, 329 U.S. 416, 422-3 (1947).
Although the domicil of domestic corporations might justify taxation without appor-
tionment, nearly all states do provide for allocation of franchise and income taxes in
the case of domestic as well as foreign corporate taxpayers.
76. Equal protection is not the only constitutional guarantee invoked against tax
statutes by foreign corporations, but it is the one which arises most frequently in con-
nection with the franchise taxes imposed on foreign corporations as such.
The commerce clause prohibition of direct tax burdens on interstate commerce may
be invoked by domestic as well as by foreign companies. E.g., J.D. Adams Mfg. Co. v.
Storen, 304 U.S. 307 (1938).
The due process requirement raises not only the question of what the tax base may
be, note 75 supra, but also that of what degree of local business brings the transactions
of a foreign corporation within a state's tax jurisdiction. The farthest advance in this
area has been in requiring nonresident vendors to collect use taxes although their only
activity in the taxing state was solicitation of orders by traveling salesmen. General
Trading Co. v. State Tax Commission, 322 U.S. 335 (1944); Note, 57 HARV. L. REV.
1086 (1944). And although a foreign corporation doing a purely interstate business cannot
be taxed for the privilege of carrying on that business, see note 24 supra, a nonresident mall
order house which ships goods across state lines on orders solicited only through the cir-
culation of catalogues is not immune from being required to collect a use tax on those sales
for the buyer's state if it is also maintaining retail stores in that state. Nelson v. Sears,
Roebuck & Co., 312 U.S. 359 (1941). See Hellerstein, State Franchise Taxation of Inlter-
state Business, 4 TAx L. Rlv. 95 (1948) ; Steiner, The Alabama Use Taxr and Inter-
state Commerce, 9 AiA. LAvYER 282 (1948).
77. 216 U.S. 400 (1910).
78. But the acquisition of fixed and permanent property is not a prerequisite to
invalidation under the equal protection clause of a tax on net receipts imposed on for-
eign but not on domestic companies. Hanover Fire Ins. Co. v. Harding, 272 U.S. 494
(1926).
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But complete identity of franchise taxes is not required. Separate taxes on
foreign and on domestic corporations, though measured by different tax
bases and resulting inevitably in different tax liability, will be valid if they
are roughly equivalent.79
However, the guarantee of equal protection was early held not to come
into play until after a corporation has been admitted to a state,' and this is
the gap which permits the more patent examples of discrimination. State
power to exclude a corporation altogether has been relied upon to uphold
entrance taxes larger than any corresponding levy on domestic corpora-
tions.9' Furthermore, this power apparently permits a discriminatory fran-
chise tax in the guise of an entrance fee. If the proper formula has been
invoked in the granting of admission, Southen Ry. v. Greene may be effec-
tively avoided. In Lincoln National Life Ins. Co. v. Read,s2 the Supreme
Court held that a state may provide for recurrent "admission" of foreign
corporations for short terms and at each "readmission" require payment of
an "entrance fee" more onerous than the taxes it imposes on domestic cor-
porations."3 The Court rejected the doctrine established in earlier tax deci-
79. St. Louis S.W. Ry. v. Arkansas, 235 U.S. 350, 366 (1914) (separate annual
franchise taxes based on capital stock of foreign and of domestic corporations) ; Aetna
Ins. Co. v. Hobbs, 160 Kan. 300, 311, 161 P.2d 726, 734 (1945), aff'd, V28 U.S. 322
(1946) (tax on domestic insurance companies based on capital; tax on foreign, based
on premiums); cf. Atlantic Refining Co. v. Virginia, 302 U.S. 22, 31 (1937) (entrance
tax on foreign corporations offset by annual franchise tax on domestic corporations). But
cf. Wheeling Steel Corp. v. Glander, 337 U.S. 562 (1949) (ad valorem tax on intangibles
arising from certain transactions of foreign corporations held not offset by statutory "red-
procity" scheme which would leave other states free to tax similar transactions of
domestic corporations) ; Hanover Fire Ins. Co. v. Harding, 272 U.S. 494 (1926) (tax on
net receipts of foreign insurance companies violated equal protection where corres-
ponding tax on domestic companies was levied on personal property at a valuation of
30% of its full worth).
80. Philadelphia Fire Ass'n v. New York, 119 U.S. 110 (1S36). With regard to
the subordination of this principle to the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions and its
later liberation therefrom, see note 27 supra and text accompanying note 85 infIra.
81. Atlantic Refining Co. v. Virginia, 302 U.S. 22 (1937), 24 VA. L. REV. 3 26 (1933)
(state's right to refuse to grant privilege of doing business justified a single, non-recur-
rent charge based on the corporation's authorized stock). Sce Hanover Fire Ins. Co. v.
Harding, 272 U.S. 494, 510-11 (1926) (amount of fee for privilege of admission is in
discretion of state, whereas equality is required in taxes imposed thereafter).
82. 325 U.S. 673 (1945).
83. To reach this result the Court had to rely heavily on slender distinctions as to
the form of admission. The Court had earlier said that a state which required admitted
foreign corporations annually to procure an authorization showing compliance with its
tax laws could not relieve itself of the equal protection requirement with respect to a tax
on net receipts by arguing that failure to comply would justify revocation or "refusal to
renew." Hanover Fire Ins. Co. v. Harding, 272 U.S. 494, 514 (1926). See Note, 36
MicH. L. Rr v. 1013 (1938). This holding was distinguished in the Lincoln opinion on the
ground that the Hanover Co. had been granted an "unequivocal license." Lincoln Na-
tional Life Ins. Co. v. Read, 325 U.S. 673, 676 (1945).
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sions 84 that a state may not require the surrender of a constitutional right
as a condition of doing business,8 5 and took doctrinal refuge in the state's
power to exclude the corporation altogether."5 The exclusion power thus
permits any legislature, if it has exercised tax-conscious foresight in framing
its registration statute, to disregard the equal protection clause 1 and to
control "foreign" competition with a flexibility made possible by changeable
tax levies 8 Perhaps the only effective check on undue discrimination has
been the fear of killing a goose that lays golden eggs.89
EQUALITY BY STATUTE
It has become a truism that a corporation by entering a foreign state
subjects itself to local laws. 8 This derives from the ancient principle that
84. See note 27 mtpra.
85. Lincoln National Life Ins. Co. v. Read, 325 U.S. 673, 677 (1945).
86. Id. at 678.
87. The use of a short-term admission to circumvent equal protection is not a now
idea. In Philadelphia Fire Ass'n v. New York, 119 U.S. 110 (1886), the imposition,
after initial admission, of a new retaliatory tax on corporations of a particular state did
not violate equal protection, since admission had been for one-year periods. But the
doctrine of "unconstitutional conditions," which appeared in the dissenting opinion in
that case, gained acceptance in the tax field. See note 27 supra. The Greene opinion
itself indicated the loophole, pointing out that the question there under consideration
was not one of renewal of a limited license. Southern Ry. v. Greene, 216 U.S. 400,
413 (1910). HENDERSON, op. cit. supra note 16, at 159-62, argued that the doctrine
of "unconstitutional conditions" should be applied to admission fees to prevent the kind
of discrimination sanctioned in the Lincoln case.
88. This freedom, of course, does not exist with respect to corporations already
"unequivocally" admitted to a state. Some states explicitly fix the duration of the au-
thority to do business. E.g., Tax. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 1529 (1925) (ten years),
VT. STAT. § 5984 (1947) (one year). But explicit limitation to a term is not necessary
in order to make applicable the rule of Lincoln National Life Insurance Co. v. Read,
325 U.S. 673 (1945), since the state constitutional provision which governed that case
limited the term only by implication, calling the annual tax an "entrance fee" and stipu-
lating that refusal to pay taxes or fees should work a forfeiture of the license to do
business. OKLA. CoNsT. Art. XIX, §§ 1, 2. Cf. OaR. Co~t'. LAWS ANN. § 77-304 (1940)
(certificate invalid in any legal proceeding unless accompanied by evidence of payment
of last annual license fee).
89. See Mr. Justice Brandeis, dissenting in Louis K. Liggett Co. v. Lee, 288 U.S.
517, 541, 545 (1933). These benefits are frequently worth bidding for. New York, in
1892, granted a special charter modelled on New Jersey law to General Electric Co.
to dissuade it from incorporating in the latter state. Id. at 561-2. Sizable financial
inducements may be offered. See, e.g., Midwest Sportswear Mfg. Co. v. Baraboo Chamber
of Commerce, 161 F.2d 918 (7th Cir. 1947) (defendant paid foreign corporation's ex-
penses of moving into the community and agreed to deed factory to it if it expended
$250,000 in payroll within five years). Florida passed a constitutional amendment in
1934 exempting motion picture studios from all ad valorem taxation for fifteen years.
FLA. CoNsT. Art. IX, § 14.
90. See, e.g., E. C. Warner Co. v. W. B. Foshay Co., 57 F.2d 656, 661 (8th Cir.),
cert. denied, 286 U.S. 558 (1932) ; Trounstine v. Bauer, Pogue & Co., 44 F. Supp. 767,
770 (S.D.N.Y. 1942), aff'd, 144 F.2d 379 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 323 U.S. 777 (1944);
17 FLErcHE, op. cit. supra note 1, § 8339.
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the powers granted by the chartering state carry no extraterritorial force:
they may be limited as the foreign state may choose.91 Frequently the cor-
poration's powers are trimmed to the measure of those enjoyed by locally
incorporated enterprises; 92 in other cases they are merely trimmedY3 Many
states have enacted broad "equality" provisions, which call in general terms
for the same privileges and liabilities to be applied to the foreign as to the
domestic corporation.94
In some contexts these provisions may have the effect of merely restating
the equal protection clause of the Federal Constitution; in others they go
further. In general, the "equality" statutes may subject the foreign cor-
poration to local ground rules 15 on such diverse matters as statutes of
91. See text accompanying notes 13-16 supra.
92. See note 94 infra. Contrary to the traditional notion that a state cannot confer
upon a foreign corporation any powers not granted by the charter state, see Bank of
Augusta v. Earle, 13 Pet. 519,-587 (U.S. 1839), charter powers are in effect sometimes
expanded. See Note, The Powers of Corporations and the Conflict of Laws, 40 Cor. L.
Rnv. 1210 (1940).
93. Arizona, for example, forbids any alien corporation to hold any land vithin the
state. AIZ. Coax ANx. § 53-804 (1939).
94. The provisions vary considerably in their scope, e.g., C.L. Con.s?. Art. XII § 15
("No [foreign] corporation... shall be allowed to transact business within the state
on more favorable conditions than are prescribed by law to similar corporations organized
under the laws of this state."); IND. STAT. AxN. § 25-302 (Burns, 1933) ("te same, but
no greater, rights and privileges, and be subject to the same liabilities, restrictions,
duties and penalties, now in force or hereafter imposed upon domestic corporations of
like character, and to the same extent as if it had been organized under this act to trans-
act the business for which its certificate of admission is issued."); N.Y. STocn Cora.
LAW § 114 ("[T]he officers, directors and stockholders ... shall be liable ... in the
same manner and to the same extent as the officers, directors and stockholders of a
domestic corporation, for the making of 1. Unauthorized dividends; 2. Unlawful loans to
stockholders; 3. False certificates, reports or public notices; 4. Illegal transfers of the
stock and property of such corporation when it is insolvent or its insolvency is
threatened."); Orno GEN. CODE ANN. § 8625-16 (1933) ("No foreign corporation shall
transact in this state any business which could not be lawfully transacted by a domestic
corporation.").
95. Complete identity of treatment for foreign and domestic corporations is of course
impracticable. If domestic corporations are required, for instance, to hold directors' meet-
ings in the home state, it is hardly reasonable to impose the same requirement on
foreign companies. See 2 RABEL, TxE CONFLIcr OF LAws 83 (1947). Such considerations
probably underlie statutes of the type in effect in California, asserting that liabilities of
directors for unauthorized dividends may be enforced by stockholders in the courts of
the state, but according to the laws of the place of incorporation. CAr. Con. COon ANNr.
§ 6601 (1947). Ideas of fairness can be invoked on the other side as well: it seems as
reasonable to expect officers and even stockholders to know the laws of states where a
corporation does business as to expect those who deal with it to recognize its foreignness
and to know the law of its home state. See Spector v. Brandriss, 144 Misc. 848, 851,
259 N.Y. Supp. 558, 560 (fun. Ct. 1932), reV'd, 184 Misc. 40, 54 N.Y.S2d 527 (Sup.
Ct. 1933) (statutory liability of stockholders for wages).
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limitation," illegal businesses,97 statutory modifications of tort liability,"
suability after corporate demise, 9 and sometimes even validity of stock
issues,"'° legality of dividends, 101 and stockholders' liability to creditors.102
Absent an "equality" statute, local courts looking to traditional conflict of
laws rules might in some circumstances be inclined to apply the law of the
chartering state.'03
These statutes are designed to take some of the slack out of the loose in-
corporation provisions deliberately adopted by greedy legislatures. How-
ever, an extreme application of the equality idea would force a foreign cor-
poration with far-flung activities to conform its capital structure and busi-
ness practices to possibly aberrational local laws.10 4 Thus these laws may
indirectly exert an extraterritorial influence. 05 State courts, however, often
take a less Olympian stand,' and permit a corporation with nonconforming
96. American Surety Co. of New York v. Blake, 45 Idaho 159, 261 Pac. 239 (1927).
97. State ex rel. Physicians' Defense Co. v. Laylin, 73 Ohio St. 90, 76 N.E. 567
(1905).
98. Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Jenkins, 297 U.S. 629 (1936).
99. Mieyr v. Federal Surety Co. of Davenport, 94 Mont. 508, 521, 23 P.2d 959, 963
(1933), rev/d on other grounds sub nor. Clark v. Williard, 292 U.S. 112 (1934).
100. State ex rel. Weede v. Iowa Southern Utilities Co. of Delaware, 231 Iowa 784,
2 N.W.2d 372, modified, 4 N.W.2d 869 (1942).
101. See note 110 infra.
102. See note 108 infra.
103. The traditional rule is that a corporation can exercise any of the powers granted
by the state of incorporation, provided such exercise is not prohibited by, the law of the
state where it is to be performed. IESTATEME , CONFLICr oF LAWS § 165 (1934). If
such a power exceeds those of domestic corporations, an equality statute serves to make
the prohibition explicit. In the absence of such a statute the general rule favors the ap-
plication of the law of the charter state with respect to the period after corporate dis-
solution during which a corporation may be sued, 17 FiExTCii-R, op. cit. supra note 1,
§ 8583; the validity of stock issues, 17 id. § 8435; legality of dividends, 11 id. § 5334; and
-liabilities of stockholders, 17 id. § 8326. With these rules compare the results reached
under equality statutes in cases cited notes 99-102 supra.
104. In Firemen's Ins. Co. v. Beha, 30 F.2d 539 (S.D.N.Y. 1928), it was held that
under a special equality statute requiring investments of foreign insurance companies
to be of the same general character as those of domestic, a state official might revoke the
license of a company making improper investments.
105. This extraterritorial effect was challenged in Firemen's Insurance Co. v. Bella,
supra note 104, as an unconstitutional attempt to control the company's operations out-
side the jurisdiction of the regulating state; it was upheld by the court as being ancillary
to genuinely local purposes. Id. at 542. Cf. Hammond Packing Co. v. Arkansas, 212
U.S. 322 (1909) (fine imposed for price-fixing agreement entered into outside the state) ;
State ex rel. Weede v. Iowa Southern Utilities Co. of Delaware, 231 Iowa 784, 2
N.W.2d 372, modified, 4 N.W.2d 869 (1942), 28 IowA L. Ray. 141 (cannot dissolve
"tramp" corporation, but may declare void a locally illegal stock issue).
106. See State ex rel. Standard Tank Car Co. v. Sullivan, 282 Mo. 261, 281-2, 221
S.W. 728, 735 (1920) (literal application of equality provisions to corporate structures
would result in exclusion of large proportion of all foreign corporations). Some states
have enacted statutes to the effect that a foreign corporation will not be excluded by
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characteristics to be admitted, 17 but deny to it, locally, the advantages
secured by the nonconformity. Thus an exemption from liability granted
any class of stock by the corporation's charter, though it does not preclude
admission, may be denied any effect if local statutory policy imposes liability
on all stockholders.' But there is less room for middle ground where the
issue involves corporate activity rather than corporate form. Some cor-
porate activities, such as the payment of dividends and the issuance of
stock, are necessarily carried out on a national scale without regard to
geographical boundaries. One type of equality statute " has been held to
reason of the fact that the laws of its charter state differ from the local laws, e.g., ILL
ARNw. STAT. c. 32, § 157.102 (1934). See Stevens, Uniform Corporation Laws through
Interstate Compacts and Federal Legislation, 34 MAicn. L. R-v. 1063, 1063 (1936).
107. Commonwealth Acceptance Corp. v. Jordan, 198 Cal. 618, 246 Pac. 796 (1926)
(no-par stock; mandamus to compel admission) ; State ex ret. Standard Tank Car Co.
v. Sullivan, 282 Mo. 261, 221 S.W. 728 (1920) (same) ; Washington cx rel. Fibreboard
Products, Inc., v. Hinkle, 147 Wash. 10, 264 Pac. 1010 (1928) (common stock divided
into two classes). But cf. State ex rel. Weede v. Iowa Southern Utilities Co. of Dela-
ware, 231 Iowa 784, 2 N.NV2d 372, modificd, 4 N.V2d 869 (1942), note 105 supra.
When the noncomformity is with respect to the kind of business carried on, an equal-
ity statute which permits only locally lawful businesses will preclude admission. Amer-
ican Telephone & Telegraph Co. v. Secretary of State, 159 Mich. 195, 123 N.W.
568 (1909) (power in single company to carry on both telephone and telegraph busi-
ness); State ex rel. Physicians' Defense Co. v. Laylin, 73 Ohio St. 90, 76 N.E. 567
(1905) (professional services). A perverse application of a statute forbidding a foreign
corporation to exercise powers denied to domestic corporations occurred in an action to
impose statutory liability on holders of bank stock, where a corporation licensed upon
admission to carry on a brokerage business successfully raised a defense of ultra vires,
because of a local prohibition against intercorporate stockholding. Golden Y. Cervenka,
278 Ill. 409, 116 N.E. 273 (1917).
108. Thomas v. Matthiessen, 232 U.S. 221 (1914) (though a foreign charter exempted
stockholders from personal liability for corporate debts, nonresident stockholder held
liable as having assented to liability imposed by local statute, where charter recited
purpose to do business in foreign state) ; Provident Gold Mining Co. v. Haynes, 173 Cal.
44, 159 Pac. 155 (1916) (under statute specifically subjecting stockholders of foreign
corporations to same liability as domestic, stockholder held to have assented though
charter did not show purpose to do business in any particular state) ; Bailey v. Wagner-
Thoreson Co., 125 Cal. App. 679, 14 P.2d 121 (1932) (stockholder could not escape
liability by pleading that stock was divided into different classes and that local law made
no provision for imposing liability in such cases). One writer suggests that liability of a
stockholder requires some "contacts" between the stockholder and the regulating state,
such as residence or an express charter purpose to carry on business in the state, beyond
the mere doing of business in the state. See Holt, Full Faith and Credit-A Suggested
Approach to the Probles. of Recognition of Foreign Corporations, 89 U. oF PA. L. REV.
453, 471 (1941).
109. That of New York, supra note 94, which prescribes the liabilities of officers, di-
rectors, and stockholders for specified acts, including unauthorized dividends. The courts
in New York have construed the statute broadly: Irving Trust Co. v. Maryland Casualty
Co., 83 F.2d 168 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 299 U.S. 571 (1936) (preferential transfers
by foreign corporation invalidated by virtue of statute imposing liability therefor on
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make a dividend payment illegal even though permitted by the law of the
charter state."0 Thus the standard imposed by the strictest state in which
corporations do business can tend to become the uniform law of all states.
While uniformity may be appealing, it should not be at the expense of letting
the tail wag the dog.
The sway of these "equality" statutes can be limited if the corporations
operating on a national scale establish locally chartered subsidiaries.", In
the absence of this foresight on the part of corporations, courts have found
means to avoid forcing total conformity with stringent local statutes threat-
ening regulation of over-all corporate affairs. Courts have long declined to
interfere with the "internal affairs" of foreign corporations,'
2 including
such matters as the election of directors 113 and the declaration of divi-
officers, directors and stockholders) ; In re Burnet-Clark, Ltd., 56 F.2d 744 (2d Cir. 1932)
(directors liable to trustee in bankruptcy for purchase of stock by corporation from a
director, though that act not enumerated in statute); German-American Coffee Co. v.
Diehl, 216 N.Y. 57, 109 N.E. 875 (1915) (corporation itself may enforce director's
statutory liability for wrongful dividends). But cf. Hayman v. Morris, 36 N.Y.S.2d
756 (Sup. Ct. 1942) (directors and majority stockholder not liable in derivative action
for loss to corporation through dealings in its own stock).
110. International Ticket Scale Corp. v. United States, 165 F.2d 358 (2d Cir. 1948)
(statute amounts to prohibiting locally illegal dividends, for purposes of federal undis-
tributed profits tax). The opinion brushes aside dictum in Borg v. International Silver
Co., 11 F.2d 147, 151 (2d Cir. 1925), which found "curiously fanciful" the notion that
a dividend legal in the state of incorporation could be illegal in New York.
111. The use of subsidiaries has been extensive. Of the Delaware industrial corpora-
tions whose stock was traded on the New York Stock Exchange in 1931, 86% had one
or more subsidiaries. LARcom, op. cit. supra note 4, at 70. A large corporation may
find it less expensive taxwise to form a relatively small, locally chartered subsidiary
than to qualify as a foreign corporation and pay single or recurrent fees based on its
capital. Subsidiaries have sometimes been useful in evading jurisdiction as well as
taxes. Service of process on a wholly owned sales subsidiary has been found insufficient
to confer jurisdiction over the parent where the existence of distinct corporate entities Is
recognized in the business and bookkeeping practices. Cannon Mfg. Co. v. Cudahy Pack-
ing Co., 267 U.S. 333 (1925). But service on a subsidiary may be held to be service on
the parent company's agent. Industrial Research Corp. v. General Motors Corp., 29
F.2d 623 (N.D. Ohio 1928) (patent infringement by subsidiary; service effective). See
LAIrY, SuBsIDIARIES AND AFFILIATED CoRpoRATixs 60-4 (1936).
112. A classic statement of the doctrine was given in North State Copper & Gold
Mining Co. v. Field, 64 Md. 151, 154, 20 At. 1039, 1040 (1885) : "[W]here the act com-
plained of affects the complainant solely in his capacity as a member of the corporation,
whether it be as stockholder, director, president, or other officer, and is the act of the
corporation, . . . then such action is the management of the internal affairs of the
corporation, and in case of a foreign corporation, our Courts will not take jurisdiction."
The rule has received legislative recognition : ILi.. ANN. STAT. c. 32, § 157.102 (1934)
("[N]othing in this Act contained shall be construed to authorize this State to regulate
the organization or the internal affairs of such corporation.").
-113. Aston v. O'Carroll, 66 F. Supp. 585 (M.D. Pa. 1946) - Rohlsen v. Latin Ameri-
can Airways, Inc., 65 N.Y.S.2d 644 (Sup. Ct. 1946).
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dends.1 4 But the "internal affairs" doctrine is sufficiently pliable to adjust
to the reality that the state of incorporation may not be the state of principal
business activity. The presence of a corporation's principal officers,' 1 ' rec-
ords,1 6 property, 17 or business transactions 118 within the state of the foruni
will lead a court to invoke countervailing considerations of convenience,
efficiency, and justice,1 9 and may permit regulation by local courts, perhaps
in accord with local standards. 20 It is in just this situation, moreover, that
local regulation is most defensible. Regulation is coming to depend more
on the strength of local contacts and less on the presumptuous labels "for-
eign" and "domestic."
CONCLUSION
Nation-wide corporate activities are not easily reconciled with legislative
diversity. It is unfortunate that courts and legislatures have so often tended
to predicate their solutions upon the early notion that a corporation can
have no existence outside the state of its charter except upon sufferance."'
Local economic activity of foreign corporations, before or after admission,
is as real as the corporal existence of a nonresident natural person, whose
legal status, unlike that of a corporate personality, is made secure by the
privileges and immunities clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 2- The
114. Goldstein v. Lightner, 266 App. Div. 357, 42 N.Y.S.2d 338 (1st Dep't 1943),
aff'd, 292 N.Y. 670, 56 N.E.2d 98 (1944).
115. Voorhees v. Mason, 245 IIl. 256, 91 N.E. 1056 (1910) (bill for accounting after
issue of promotion stock).
116. Rogers v. American Tobacco Co., 143 Misc. 306, 257 N.Y. Supp. 321 (Sup. Ct.),
aff'd, 233 App. Div. 708, 249 N.Y. Supp. 993 (1st Dep't 1931) (mandamus to allow
stockholder to exmine minutes).
117. Hunter v. Merger Mines Corp., 67 Idaho 115, 170 P.2d 800 (1946) (court order
for stockholders' meeting and election of directors).
118. State ex rel. Weede v. Iowa Southern Utilities Co. of Delaware, 231 Iowa 784,
2 NAV.2d 372, nodified, 4 NAV.2d 869 (1942) (illegal issue of no-par stock of Delarare
corporation operating entirely in Iowa declared void).
119. See Rogers v. Guaranty Trust Co. of New York, 288 U.S. 123, 131 (1933) ; State
ex rel. Weede v. Iowa Southern Utilities Co. of Delaware, supra note 118. On the
present status of the "internal affairs" doctrine, see Note, 97 U. oF PA. L RE%. 665 (1949).
120. To take jurisdiction is not necessarily to apply local law. But once the hurdle of
possible dismissal under the internal affairs rule is overcome, an equality statute may
impel a court to choose forum law rather than that of the charter state. Even an ap-
plication of the latter, where there is room for interpretation, may be strongly tinged
with local policy.
121. The full faith and credit requirement of the Federal Constitution is a possible
basis for recognition of foreign corporations. See Holt, supra note 103. The soundness
of this proposal is perhaps enhanced by the 1948 revision of the Judicial Code, which
brought the statutory language into conformity with that of the Constitution by making
"Acts" as well as "records and judicial proceedings" entitled to full faith and credit.
28 U.S.C. § 1738 and Reviser's Notes (Supp. 1949).
122. See note 15 supra.
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need for protection may be equally great; conceptual distinctions offer cold
comfort. But extension of privileges and immunities to corporations is not a
likely development.123 Nor is the doctrine of a power to exclude likely to be
abandoned. 124 Complete exclusion is rarely more than a threat; the promise
of economic benefit forbids its exercise. But it will doubtless continue to
serve as a springboard for judicial protection of provincialism.
The theoretical power to exclude has been made sufficiently sweeping to
rationalize significant barriers to the growth of corporate enterprise along
economic lines undistorted by political boundaries. Federal incorporation of
enterprises carrying on interstate business is a conceivable solution. 12 5 But
the problem does not necessarily call for radical departure from our system
of state charters. Both courts and legislatures have shown that by retreating
from the logic of the exclusion power it is possible to minimize political inter-
ference with economic growth, without shackling a state's power to protect
its citizens from abuse by foreign firms.
123. Far from suggesting that the privileges and immunities clause may be held to
apply to corporations after all, recent judicial dissents from prevailing theory have looked
toward withdrawing from corporations even the other protections-due process and equal
protection-granted by the .Fourteenth Amendment. See Justice Douglas, dissenting
in Wheeling Steel Corp. v. Glander, 337 U.S. 562, 576 et seq. (1949) ; Justice Black,
dissenting in Connecticut General Life Ins. Co. v. Johnson, 303 U.S. 77, 83, 85 et seq.
(1938).
124. The cases appear to fall short of proving the existence of an unqualified power
to exclude. See Holt, supra note 108. But the Supreme Court continues to affirm it,
even when finding state action constitutionally invalid. See Wheeling Steel Corp. v.
Glander, 337 U.S. 562, 571 (1949) (ad valorem tax on intangibles).
125. A series of federal licensing bills was the subject of extensive committee hear-
ings under the leadership of Senator O'Mahoney in 1937 and 1938, but no legislation re-
sulted. See Hearings before a Subcommittee of the Committee on the Judiciary on S.
10 and S. 3072, 75th Cong., 1st and 3d Sess. (1937-8). Such federal action has had
support in responsible quarters for nearly fifty years. See SEN. Doc. No. 92, Part 69-A,
70th Cong., 1st Sess. (1934) (compilation of proposals and views). It has even been
urged by representatives of business. See, e.g., the report of a committee of the Na-
tional Association of Manufacturers in 1908, quoted in id. at 56, favoring compulsory
federal incorporation; Robbins, Federal Licensing of Business Corporations, 13 TULANEn
L. REv. 214, 217-9 (1939). The immunity of interstate business from state regulation
and the supposed helplessness of the states in protecting their residents against the giant
corporations has beeft a leading argument for federal licensing or chartering. See, e.g,,
Chaplin, National Incorporation, 5 Coi. L. Rav. 415, 427-8 (1905) ; cf. Berlack, Federal
Incorporation and Securities Regulation, 49 HARv. L. REV. 396, 404, 409-13 (1936).
Federal incorporation as a means of protecting foreign corporations from discriminatory
state laws would presumably have far less political appeal.
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